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Abstract-- This paper presents an analysis of a rules-based 
approach and a statistical anomaly approach to Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS). Two IDS systems are implemented. 
Analysis and comparisons of the systems are presented, as well as 
conclusions regarding the two approaches. 
 
Index Terms—Communications systems security, Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS), Rule-based approaches, Statistical 
approaches, Ping of Death.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
NCREASES in the interconnectivity of computers and 
computer networks as well as the rising level of 
sophistication and automation of intrusive attacks make IDS a 
tool of great importance to the network administrator. 
However, a poor choice in IDS systems can do more harm 
than good by providing a false sense of security. Research in 
IDS systems has flourished in the last decade and has attracted 
extensive efforts in the recent years [1-10]. 
 
IDS systems attempt to provide a safety net to other 
network security systems. An effective IDS implementation 
makes no assumptions about the effectiveness of other 
network security services. All activity is suspect and 
monitored to assess the perceived threat of the actions. 
Threatening behavior is responded to via logging, reporting or 
some action on the part of the IDS or related systems. 
The value of an IDS system lies in its ability to accurately 
determine if an action is a result of an intrusion or normal 
behavior.   
 
Intrusion detection systems fall into two broad categories. 
The first approach is Statistical Anomaly Detection. The 
underlying premise of this approach is that an intruder’s 
activity will differ from that of a legitimate user. Legitimate 
user behavior is derived by analyzing past activity. 
Aberrations that are outside expected deviations are reported 
as the act of an intruder. The strength of statistical approaches 
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is that attacks are defined as any non-normal activity, so it can 
theoretically guard against any type of attack.  
 
The second approach is Rules-Based Detection. A rules-
based detection system defines specific activity as being an 
intrusion. The system looks for known attacks or defined 
behaviors and reports when these are observed.  
This paper presents an examination of both approaches to 
IDS. We have developed and implemented a rules-based and a 
statistical anomaly IDS system. Both IDS systems monitored a 
Web-based wire transfer application of similar architecture.  
Analysis of the two systems reveals their respective strengths 
and weaknesses. 
II.  TECHNIQUES AND IMPLEMENTATION 
We have developed two IDS implementations. One was a 
rules-based approach, the other a statistical anomaly approach. 
The rules-based system evaluates actions on the rule-set alone 
and the statistical approach evaluated actions only against 
statistical models of historical data.  
 
As mentioned, both systems monitored a Web-based wire 
transfer system. Users interact with the database via a Web 
front-end. All activity is monitored surreptitiously by a second 
IDS database. The respective IDS algorithms are implemented 
within the interaction between the two databases, easily 
hidden to the front-end user.  
 
The system administrator can interact with the IDS 
database via a separate Web site or an isolated section of the 
production Web site. There the administrator can view 
logging and report data, or in the case of the rules-based 
implementation, they can define and modify the rule set. 
 
Both systems use Microsoft IIS Server to host the Web 
front-end applications (user and administrator components). 
ASP code using VBScript was used to program the 
applications and both rely on Microsoft databases as a back-
end. The rules-based system uses MS Access, while the 
statistical anomaly approach uses MS SQL Server. Figure 1 
shows the system architecture and Figure 2 shows the used 
system tools in development.  
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Fig. 1. System Architecture 
 
Fig. 2. System Tools. 
 
III.  DETAILS OF RULES-BASED IMPLEMENTATION 
The front-end comprises a variety of different screens, each 
performing functions that are checked by the IDS system. The 
login screen provides a security service by authenticating 
users. Additionally, it also determines the user’s level of 
access based on the type of user (administrator versus 
standard user). 
  
Once an administrator logs in successfully the application 
points to the administration screen where intrusion attempts 
are reported. These reports indicate log-in failures as well as 
any other unauthorized activity that falls within the scope of 
the rule set. This reporting module allows the administrator 
quick access to data regarding possible intrusions. 
 
Also, within this section of the site, the administrator can 
change elements of the rule set thus allowing for a degree of 
customization in the application. Rules can be changed 
periodically to reflect changing activity within the system, 
resulting in few false positive reports of intrusion. 
 
Standard users successfully logging in will be directed to 
the Banking screen. This screen allows the user to transfer 
money from one account to another. Users can also add new 
accounts, and log out of the application.  
 
The Banking screen consists of two drop-down menus 
determining the account source and destination of the transfer. 
A text box is provided for entering monetary values.  
The system’s back-end consists of two separate databases. 
The first database is called Rules.mdb and is the production 
database, designed to store the information captured from the 
front-end.  
 
The second database is called IDS.mdb. IDS.mdb 
implements the IDS system. This database collects 
information that has been stored in Rules.mdb and then checks 
for intrusions based on the rules stored in IDS.mdb. The 
IDS.mdb will encrypt the data that comes in if time permits, 
however the assumption is made that security precautions 
have been made to secure the web server. 
 
The actual rules are stored within tables in IDS.mdb. This 
facilitates rule changes, as the administrator merely needs to 
change the values stored in these tables. The following are 
examples of rules implemented by this system: 
 
Rules 1 through 5 evaluate log in information. 
 
Rule1: Checks for a valid user. 
Rule2: Confirms the password, 3 false logins is defined as 
an intrusion 
Rule3: Checks for user being allowed to login at that time 
Rule4: Amount of logins in a day 
Rule5: Checks to see if user was already logged in and tries 
to login simultaneously 
 
Rules 6 onwards evaluate the actions of the user after log 
in. 
Rule6: Checks the amount the user is transferring 
Rule7: Checks the accounts that the user can transfer to or 
from 
Rule8: Checks to see if user has permission to set up new 
accounts 
Rule9: Number of transactions per user in a day 
 
IV.  DETAILS OF STATISTICAL ANOMALY IMPLEMENTATION 
The application monitored by this system is very similar to 
that of the rules-based system. Users log in and are 
authenticated from the log in screen and can then process 
transactions. Log in attempts and all transactions are stored in 
a production database.  
 
This production database is tied to an IDS database that 
evaluates the transactions and assigns them an alert level 
depending on the evaluated level of suspicion. This evaluation 
occurs as the transaction takes place and could be 
programmed to send alerts to the administrator in real-time. 
 
The administrator logs in to a separate site that access the 
IDS database. There the administrator can view reports on the 
activity in the production database. Reports can be filtered by 
alert level to ignore innocuous transactions. 
 
Data in the IDS database is encrypted to thwart attackers 
who gain access to the IDS database. While the encryption 
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employed in this system is very modest (values are converted 
to ASCII values, shifted two positions and written back in 
reverse), it is implemented as a separate ‘black-box’ function 
that can easily be swapped out for a more secure encryption 
scheme. 
 
The anomaly detection engine is implemented as SQL 
Server stored procedures. These procedures can be encrypted 
by SQL Server to provide additional security. However, once 
encrypted they cannot be decrypted even by the developer. To 
facilitate development the stored procedures were not 
encrypted in this implementation. 
 
The stored procedure that assesses the alert level does so 
by performing analysis on the historical data in the system. To 
do this the data is decrypted and stored in a staging table so 
that analysis can be performed. Once an alert level has been 
determined it is encrypted and stored in the transaction table 
with the corresponding transaction. The decrypted data in the 
staging table is immediately purged once the alert level is 
determined. 
 
Alert levels are determined by measuring current activity 
against previous activity. This is achieved by constructing 
profiles of normal activity. Actions are decomposed into their 
component parts and evaluated against the corresponding 
property of the ‘normal’ profile. 
Profiles model entities in the database such as the user and 
the bank accounts. The profile consists of a property, the 
properties average value and a standard deviation for the 
range of values associated with that property. An example 
would be the following: 
 
A new transaction amount is tested to determine if it falls 
with the standard deviation for the average value, which 
would be expected. Values outside the standard deviation 
increment the alert value. The further the new values vary 
from the standard deviation, the higher the alert value is 
incremented. 
 
Each property associated with the transaction is measured 
in a like fashion and a final alert value is determined. This 
value is then stored in the IDS database with its transaction. 
 
As mentioned previously reporting on this data is provided 
via a Web page that can be filtered by alert level.  
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The strength of statistical approach is the fact that 
intrusions are defined as any non-normal activity. Rules do 
not have to be defined to cover all possible intrusions. Any 
activity that does not relate closely to previous activity is 
regarded as an intrusion. However, this implementation is far 
more processor intensive. With each transaction the system 
must create a profile of all the entities involved in the 
transaction and measure the profile properties against the 
corresponding component of the new transaction.  
 
The current implementation is small enough to run without 
problem. However even given the scope of this approach, 
each transaction has at least four components (users, account 
source, account destination and amount). Therefore, each 
incremental increase of activity in the production database 
could result in a fourfold increase in activity in the IDS 
database. 
 
Creating models and storing them in the database could 
address this issue. The system could then simply retrieve the 
constructed model and perform its evaluations. However the 
model would still need to be refreshed periodically, and this 
refresh would be processor intensive.  
 
This problem is a much smaller factor in the rules-based 
approach. Each new transaction is evaluated by a simple 
Boolean evaluation of a pre-defined rule. There is no 
additional computational overhead in this system.  
The rules-based approach suffers from the limitations of its 
own finite rule set. Transactions that fall outside of the rule set 
are not evaluated and thus undetected. 
 
Both implementations are very modest in scope. As a 
result, the statistical implementation was not noticeably 
effected by the extra computational activity and the rules-
based approach was not compromised by a lack of rules. 
 
However, there was one significant aspect of the two 
systems that we were able to examine and measure. The 
statistical implementation reported far greater false-positive 
alerts than the rules-based implementation. 
 
Two theoretical users were proposed to research this issue. 
One user, Operator A, performed very regular activity in the 
database and consistently logged in successfully with one 
attempt. The other user, Operator B, executed far more 
dynamic transactions within the database and frequently had 
multiple failed log-in attempts. 
 
The statistical anomaly approach successfully modeled 
Operator A’s activity after three transactions. The three 
transactions that incurred an alert value greater than zero were 
still low, the highest alert value being three. This transaction 
was rated highest due to the fact that it was the first time it 
occurred, which systematically generates a level three alert 
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value. This transaction acts as a seed value for future 
evaluation. 
 
The statistical system could not effectively model Operator 
B’s dynamic activity. Only one transaction rated zero, while 
most transactions had alert levels greater than five. Operators 
B’s activity was too dynamic to lend itself to statistical 
modeling. 
 
This issue cannot be resolved in a pure statistical approach. 
If the statistical engine is altered it becomes a rules-based 
system by the nature of the modification. One could develop 
multiple statistical engines and implement them on a user-by-
user case, but once again rules are introduced into the system: 
 
If User A: Use Engine A 
 
The rules-based system could successfully determined that 
Operator A’s were normal from the start, there was no 
‘seeding’ time as in the statistical implementation as the rules 
are pre-defined. It could also successfully evaluate Operator 
B’s activity because the rules could be altered as they applied 
to B, giving this user more flexibility and eliminating false-
positive reports. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
IDS systems can be categorized by their method of 
intrusion detection. These methods can be placed into two 
broad categories: rules-based and statistical anomaly intrusion 
detection. The rules-based system implements a rule set to 
detect intrusive behavior, while the statistical anomaly 
approach uses mathematically-determined models to detect 
intrusion. 
 
Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. The 
statistical anomaly system can detect intrusive behavior that 
has not been pre-defined, but it is processor intensive. The 
rules-based system is far less taxing on the processor, but 
activity outside of its rule set is undetected. 
 
We found that the statistical approach has significant 
limitations in a very dynamic environment. Such an 
environment produces a rash of false-positive intrusion 
reports. These dynamic environments do not lend themselves 
to statistical modeling and must be approached carefully to 
avoid both false-positive reporting as well as false-negative 
reporting (rule sets that are too broad could fail to detect 
actual intrusions).  
 
A more effective approach to intrusion detection would be 
one that combines elements of the two systems.  
 
The ability of a statistical approach to detect unknown 
intrusions is far too valuable to be discarded in an IDS system. 
However, the ability of rules-based system to limit false-
positive alarms is also critically important to a reliable IDS 
system. Developers need to determine which activities are best 
suited to rules-based monitoring, and which lend themselves 
to a statistical approach. 
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